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RECENT CASES NOTED
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS

-

MALPRACTICE OF PHYSICIANS-

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.-Defendant

is a charitable institution

maintaining a hospital. The plaintiff submitted to an operation at
defendant's free clinic. She brings this action against the defendant
for personal injuries sustained by her due to the alleged negligence
of the doctor assigned by the defendant to perform the operation. The
plaintiff alleges that the defendant was negligent in selecting the physician assigned to her. This action was brought more than two and less
than three years after the operation. Lower court dismissed the complaint on the ground that the physician's malpractice was the basis of
the action, and the action was therefore barred by the two-year Statute of Limitations applicable to malpractice actions.
On appeal, held, reversed. A charitable institution is not liable
for the malpractice of its physicians. It may be held liable only for
its negligence in selecting doctors who are incompetent and unfit to
perform the work assigned to them. Negligence, therefore, being the
basis of the action, the suit could be brought at any time within three
years after the cause of action arose. Roewekamp v. New York PostGraduate Medical School and Hospital, 254 App. Div. 265, 4 N. Y.
Supp. (2d) 751 (2d Dept. 1938).
CONSTITUTIONAL

LAw -

FEDERAL

MUNICIPAL

BANKRUPTCY

AcT.-The question involved in this case is the constitutionality of a
federal statute providing for the composition of the debts of municipalities with the consent of the state. The bankrupt involved is an
"irrigation district" but inasmuch as it is a creature of the state, the
question of the applicability of the statute is not affected. A prior
statute was declared unconstitutional because it did not require the
consent of the state. Ashton v. Cameron County District,298 U. S.
513, 56 Sup. Ct. 892 (1936). But as amended, the statute meets all
the objections raised in the above case-the sovereignty of the state
is not encroached upon. It must be kept in mind that the states are
forbidden from "impairing the obligation of contract", hence no adequate relief to such municipal bankrupts is available from such
source. Held, the statute is constitutional. The Tenth Amendment
did not destroy, however, the right of a state to make contracts and
give consent to actions which do not contravene the Federal Constitution. The Fifth Amendment is no bar to the effectiveness of a
plan for the composition of the debts of an insolvent debtor. United
States v. Bekins, et al., -

U. S. -,

58 Sup. Ct. 811 (1938).

MOTOR VEHICLES-"GUEsT RULE"-LEX Loci.-Action to recover for personal injuries allegedly sustained in Montana. The parties were taking an automobile trip, toward the expense of which,
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each contributed a specified sum. The accident occurred in Montana
when the defendant driver, attempting to pass another car, was forced
to drive into a ditch at the side of the road. Under the Montana law
the owner or operator is not liable to a passenger riding as a guest or
by invitation unless such injuries are caused by the grossly negligent
and reckless operation of the vehicle. Held, since the accident happened in Montana, the law of that state governs the rights and liabilities of the parties. However, it is for New York courts to decide
whether a person was or. was not a "guest" or invitee within the
meaning of the Montana statute. It has been uniformly held that if
there is mutual benefit or any benefit at all conferred upon the owner
of the automobile by the presence of the "passenger", the latter is
not regarded as a guest within the statute. And the presence of the
plaintiff who agreed to contribute a specified sum toward the expenses
of the trip was within such classification. Smith v. Clute, 277 N. Y.
407, 14 N. E. (2d) 455 (1938); Cf. Master v. Horowitz, 237 App.
Div. 237, 261 N. Y. Supp. 722 (3d Dept. 1932), af'd, 262 N. Y.
609, 188 N. E. 86 (1933).

JURISDICTION-ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT OF

STATES.-Action by the Commissioner of Banks in the
name of the State of Oklahoma to recover the statutory liability of a
citizen of another state as a shareholder in an insolvent state bank.
The question arises as to whether the State of Oklahoma can invoke
the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of United States under
Article III, Section 2 (2) of the Constitution (suits between a state
and citizen of another state). Held, jurisdiction denied. It is insufficient to show that the state is the plaintiff. It must be the real party
in interest, as in Florida v. Mellon, 273 U. S. 12, 47 Sup. Ct. 265
(1927). The recovery here was for the professed purpose and benefit
of the depositors in the bank. (OKLA. STAT. § 9179) ; Oklahoma v.
THE UNITED

Cook, -

U. S. -,

58 Sup. Ct. 608 (1938) ; Cf. Kansas v. Colorado,

206 U. S. 46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655 (1906); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper
Co., 206 U. S. 230, 27 Sup. Ct. 618 (1907).

PLEADING AND PRACTICE-MOTION TO VACATE JUDGMENT ENTERED FIVE YEARS BEFORE AGAINST DEFENDANT-SECTIONS 108 AND

508 OF CIVIL PRACTICE AcT.-Plaintiff was served personally in New
Jersey by the trustees of her father's estate to appear in New York
in order to determine the respective rights and legal relations of all
parties in interest. Plaintiff defaulted and judgment was rendered
against her on the ground that she had renounced all the benefits provided for her by the will of her father, the trust being terminated by
operation of law. No copy of this judgment or notice of entry thereof
was ever served upon the plaintiff. This action was instituted after
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a lapse of five years and a motion was made to vacate the judgment.
The Court of Appeals held, motion granted. The default judgment is
within the meaning of Section 108 of the Civil Practice Act which
declares, "The court, in its discretion and upon such terms as justice
requires, at anytime within one year after notice thereof, may relieve
a party from a judgment, order or other proceeding, taken against
him through his mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect".
Section 508 of the Civil Practice Act is addressed to judgments after
trial and not to inquests on default to which Section 108 is applicable.
No necessary conflict results when the two sections are read together.
The word "notice" as used in Section 108 means service of a copy of
a default judgment with written notice of entry thereof. Redfield v.
Critchley, 277 N. Y. 336, 15 N. E. (2d) 73 (1938).

JURISDICTION-STATE

LAw-"ERIE v. TOmPKINS" DOCTRINE.

-In the instant case, the court found it necessary to construe the case
of Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817 (1938). In the
prior action defendant posted a bond in the federal court, and after a
decision for the plaintiff, the latter brought this action for attorney's
fees. Defendant contends that according to the state law, attorney
fees are deemed "damages" which are covered by the bond, and under
the doctrine of the Erie case, the federal court must adopt the ruling
of the state court. Held, for plaintiff. The bond in question is more
than a simple contract. It is part of the "machinery" of the federal
courts. The Erie case holds that state law is controlling "except in
matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress".
Since all proceedings in the federal courts, including requiring an injunction bond, are governed by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States, defendant's contention must fall. Travelers Mutual
Casualty Co. v. Skeer, - F. Supp. - (D. C. W. Mo. 1938); see
Note (1938) 13 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 71.

